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Chaucer’s prologue to the “Tale of Melibee” tends to attract more critical 
interest than the tale itself, often revolving around Chaucer’s references to a 
“litel tretys” and a  “tretys lite,” as article titles such as “ ‘This Litel Tretys’ 
Again” (by John W. Clark) and “Chaucer’s Little Treatise, The Melibee” (by 
Thomas J. Farrell) suggest. The focus of such commentaries on the prologue 
tends to be identification of the treatise, with the inevitable conclusion being 
that there is only one treatise to identify. However, careful reading of the 
passage in question reveals that the most logical conclusion is that the two 
references, to a “litel tretys” (vii.957) and a “tretys lyte” (vil.963), refer to 
separate, albeit linked, treatises. Recognition of this likelihood depends on 
focussing not simply on the question of what Chaucer refers to in the two 
lines cited above but on the larger context of the linking material preceding 
the “Tale of Sir Thopas” as well as the interruption of that tale. In focussing 
on the question of the treatise, previous commentators have not sufficiently 
considered the ways that the references to the treatises develop from the 
dialogue between Harry and the narrator begun prior to the “Thopas.” The 
dialogue between Harry and Geoffrey before and after the “Thopas” stresses 
in various ways the difficulty of finding a fixed and single meaning even for 
a single word, let alone for a person, or a tale. Chaucer’s use of the word 
“tretys” in the Thopas-Melibee link is emblematic of the way he undercuts
the idea that meaning is fixed and invariable, not only within the link itself, 
but throughout his writing. To understand the implications of granting a 
double referent to the word “tretys,” we must first consider what Harry’s 
way of reading implies.1
At issue in Harry’s comments to and discussions with the narrator is, of 
course, the reliability of Harry as interpreter; throughout the tales, Harry’s 
skills as literary critic are cast in doubt.2 Although Harry’s misreadings are 
familiar by the time we meet Geoffrey the pilgrim, Harry’s misreadings of 
Geoffrey and of his tales are especially noteworthy. Harry’s initial reading of 
Geoffrey differs from the normal type of commentary he makes about the pil­
grims; he has little or nothing to say about many of them, and when he does 
comment on other pilgrims, he identifies them by their vocations rather than 
as individuals, as Lee Patterson notes (117-18). Whereas the other pilgrims 
are identifiable according to some social role, Geoffrey is not. Patterson 
takes this difference as grounds for a discussion of Chaucer’s concern with 
his role as author in society, but of equal interest is the fact that the uniden- 
tifiability of Geoffrey leads Harry into interpretations of what Geoffrey must 
be like:
And thanne at erst he looked upon me,
And seyde thus: “What man artow” quod he;
“Thou lookest as thou woldest fynde an hare,
For evere upon the ground I se thee stare.
Approche neer, and look up murily.
Now war yow, sires, and lat this man have place!
He in the waast is shape as wel as I;
This were a popet in an arm t ’enbrace 
For any womman, smal and fair of face.
He semeth elvyssh by his contenaunce,
For unto no wight dooth he daliaunce.” (vn.694-704)
Harry’s evaluation of Geoffrey is based in appearance, in what he sees; Harry 
“looks” at Chaucer, who “looks” as if he seeks a rabbit. Here, the work 
“look” is used twice, in quick succession, and it means something differ­
ent in each instance; first, it refers to Harry’s visual perception of Geoffrey, 
but only two lines later it has acquired a different meaning, and reflects 
Harry’s interpretation of Geoffrey’s appearance. The close repetition of the 
word, and the punning shift of its meaning from naming the process of see­
ing something to interpreting the appearance of something, underscores the 
shakiness of Harry’s basis of judgment in looks, or in appearance— in sur­
faces. The pun underscores the faultiness of the assumption that appearance
dictates meaning; just as the word “look” can mean two different things in 
two different contexts, so too any two similar things can in fact be essentially 
very different.
Harry proceeds to observe physical details that suggest Geoffrey is sim­
ilar to himself— he and Geoffrey have a similar girth — so assumes a corre­
sponding internal similarity, or mirth, and he requests a mirthful tale. That 
Harry’s focus is on appearance is reiterated by his observation that Geof­
frey “seemeth. elvyssh”; that such a focus is misleading is made clear by his 
assumption that Geoffrey’s appearance will reflect the kind of tale he will 
tell: “now shul we heere /  Som deyntee thyng, me thynketh by his cheere” 
(vil.710-11). Harry recognizes a superficial correspondence between himself 
and Geoffrey, so assumes a fundamental similarity between them; that is, 
he assumes that two things that appear alike must be alike, but the dual 
meaning of the word “look” as used in the passage automatically under­
cuts Harry’s assumption. That his assumption is indeed invalid is borne out 
by his response to Geoffrey’s tale; as far as Harry is concerned, Geoffrey’s 
attempt at mirth falls woefully short of his expectations.
Harry’s response to “Sir Thopas,” which begins the material prefatory 
to the “Melibee,” further clarifies his inability to see beyond surfaces. His 
criticism of the tale is devoid of anything other than condemnation of what 
he sees as wretched rhyming; as Alan T. Gaylord notes, “he speaks only 
of the form and effect of the rhyme” (“Chaucer’s Dainty ‘Dogerel’” 85). 
P.M. Kean’s observation, “the very naivety of [Harry’s] reactions — always 
to the content in the most superficial sense, never to the art of the tales — 
enhances the comedy” (91), is generally acute, but needs some qualification: 
the significance of Harry’s obtuseness goes much deeper. Harry is a surface 
interpreter; he attacks the rhyme four times and Chaucer’s speech once in 
the course of his diatribe, but never once mentions the story being told. In 
fact, so exclusively does he focus on surface that all he recognizes is the obvi­
ousness of the rhyme, without recognizing how that obviousness, in concert 
with the content he ignores, works to make “Sir Thopas” a delightful parody, 
the sort of pure joke he asked for when requesting a tale. Charles A. Owen, 
Jr. demonstrates that the rhymes of the tale contribute substantially to the 
parody, thus further demonstrating Harry’s ineptness as an interpreter; not 
only is he incapable of understanding the content of the tale, he is not even 
a perceptive critic of its rhyme.
Harry’s failure here is especially significant in relation to the different 
meanings possible within a single word, or tale. Harry is correct to note that 
the rhyme is bad, according to the conventions of serious poetry. He fails,
however, to recognize that the mirth of the tide depends on a doubleness 
of perception, a recognition of the failure of the “Thopas” as romance in 
order to recognize its success as parody. Exactly what makes the poem 
bad according to one set of criteria makes it good according to another. 
The rhyme is good precisely because it is so risible. Harry is unable to 
recognize that more than one meaning is possible and consequently fails to 
glean anything useful, even mirth, from the “Thopas.” The tale looks like 
something other than what it is.
In response to Harry’s uninformed objections, Geoffrey offers a different 
tale, the “Melibee.” As prologue, he makes the long speech on which so 
much critical attention has focussed, a speech that addresses the problems 
of interpretation inherent in Harry’s responses to Geoffrey, but which is 
usually approached in order to figure out what “treatise” refers to. Geoffrey 
here tells his audience what to expect from him: his tale is a familiar one, 
he asserts, albeit one told in different ways and by different tellers before:
It is a moral tale vertuous,
A1 be it told somtyme in sondry wyse 
Of sondry folk, as I shal yow devise.
As thus: ye woot that every Evaungelist 
That telleth us the peyne of Jhesu Crist 
Ne seith nat alle thyng as his felawe dooth;
But natheless hir sentence is al sooth,
And alle acorden as in hire sentence,
Al be ther in hir tellyng difference.
For somme of hem seyn moore, and somme seyn lesse,
Whan they his pitous passioun expresse —
I meene of Marke, Mathew, Luc, and John —
But doutelees hir sentence is al oon.
Therfore, lordynges alle, I yow biseche,
If that yow thynke I varie as in my speche,
As thus, though that I telle somwhat moore 
Of proverbes than ye han herd bifoore 
Comprehended in this litel tretys heere,
To enforce with th’effect of my mateere;
And though I nat the same wordes seye 
As ye han herd, yet to yow alle I preye 
Blameth me nat; for, as in my sentence,
Shul ye nowher fynden difference
Fro the sentence of this tretys lite
After the which this murye tale I write, (vn.940-64)
The subject addressed is the relationship between words and sense, be­
tween tale and meaning, and the passage asserts that different tellings can
nevertheless possess the same sentence. The passage has consequently been 
used to justify arguments for the existence of a single meaning beneath the 
multi-faceted surface of the Canterbury Tales, on the assumption that the 
“tretys lite” to which Chaucer refers ought to be seen as the tales as a whole, 
rather than as the source of the tale he tells. D.W. Robertson articulates 
the claim in A Preface to Chaucer:
[I]t is usually assumed that the “tretys” is the source of the “Melibee,” but 
there is no reason to assume that Chaucer’s audience would have been so fa­
miliar with earlier versions of that story that this long explanation was called 
for. Moreover, Chaucer’s version differs so slightly from Renaud’s that there 
would have been little point in assuring everyone that the sentence remained 
unchanged in Chaucer’s translation. The “tretys” is obviously The Canter­
bury Tales itself. . . . Chaucer tells us that the “Melibee,” although it differs 
verbally from the other tales the audience has heard from the “sondry folk” 
who proceed toward Canterbury, and contains more proverbs them any of the 
others, after which it is now placed, it does not differ from them in sentence. 
(368-69)
His contention is supported by Bernard F. Huppé, who avers that the refer­
ence to the “tretys” makes no sense if it is intended to refer to the Livre de 
Mellibee et Prudence but “does make sound sense as explaining that the Tale 
of Melibeus is different in kind from the tales which have preceded it (has not 
the same words), but that in its sentence it is one with them. The sentence 
of the Tale of Melibeus is the sentence of the Canterbury Tales” (236).
Robertson and Huppé’s interpretations rest on their understanding of 
what Chaucer intended as his sentence, but the basis of their conclusions in 
the assumptions that the “tretys” referred to is all of the Canterbury Tales 
and that Chaucer’s focus is on the unity of scriptural sentence despite the 
variety of scriptural narrative has sidetracked much subsequent criticism on 
to the issue of what the “tretys” is. The contention that Chaucer’s “tretys 
lite” consists of all the tales is easy to contest, and subsequent commentaries 
attempt to offer alternatives. Nevertheless, the common ground of such com­
mentaries, presumably derived from Robertson and Huppé, is an attempt to 
come up with a reading that allows the “litel tretys” and the “tretys lite” 
to refer to some other single text, despite the fact that a more consistent 
reading, and one more in keeping with Chaucer’s consistently ironic position 
on authorial commentary, would be that the two references have different 
referents. Some consideration of the various refutations of Roberston and 
Huppé is necessary to prove this point, however.
In his attempt to refute Robertson and Huppé’s contention, John W. 
Clark merely asserts that “the narrator is not likening to the comparatively 
slight differences of the gospels the pronounced differences . . . between Me- 
libee and most of the preceding tales, but differences between various versions 
of the Melibeus-and-Prudence story which, for all he knows, may exist and 
may be well known to some of his audience” (153); he concludes that Huppé 
gives a “forced interpretation because he is so firmly committed to the view 
that he shares with Mr. D.W. Robertson, Jr., about the universally moral 
intent and allegorical method of the Canterbury Tales” (154). Similarly, 
Glending Olson focusses his discussion on determining what the “tretys” is; 
he rejects the conventional reading that it refers to Renaud’s version on the 
same grounds as does Robertson, that the differences between the two ver­
sions are too slight, but he also rejects the Robertsonian conclusion on the 
grounds that the link between the “Melibee” and the “tretys” is too spe­
cific to admit of the possibility of the “tretys” being the whole of the Tales. 
Instead, he offers his own conclusion, that the “tretys” refers to multiple 
versions of the Melibee story:
I suggest that the “litel tretys” . . . refers back to the “sondry wyse” in which 
the story of Melibee has been circulating. It may well refer specifically to 
a shorter version then known, but it does not have to; it could simply be a 
particularization of various briefer treatments, oral and/or written. (149-50)
Clark’s conclusions and Olson’s seem somewhat doubtful, since they suggest 
that the single “tretys” is the “sundry wise” (which must conceptually be 
plural) in which the tale has been told; although the tale might be called a 
“tretys” in any one of its versions, referring to various versions of it at once 
as a singular “tretys” makes little sense.
Thomas J. Farrell rejects the traditional reading, the Robertson-Huppé 
reading, and the Olson reading in favour of a reading of “tretys” as the 
“Melibee” itself by offering an emendment to Robinson’s punctuation of 
lines 955-58:
Robinson’s punctuation— a comma after “heere” — distinguishes the current 
“telling” from the “tretys,” but in so doing raises the lexical problem of “this 
. . . heere” and the rhetorical issue that Chaucer is presenting a very literal 
translation of his source. . . . This rhetorical oddity, the strained reading 
of “this heere,” and the distinction between the tale and the “tretys” can 
all be eliminated by . . . the enclosure of the whole explanatory phrase — 
“Comprehended in this litel tretys heere /  To enforce with th’ effect of my 
mateere” — in parenthetical dashes. (64)
He further suggests that in lines 963-64 “After” has as its object “sentence,” 
not “tretys,” so that the tale is written in accordance with an intended 
sentence rather than as a version of another “tretys”; hence, the “tretys 
lite” also refers to the “Melibee” (65-66). Farrell’s case for the ‘litel tretys” 
is a good one, and makes sense, but, accepting the basic assumption made 
by the scholars he is refuting, he is determined to make the “tretys lite” have 
the same referent — the “Melibee” itself— and his case here, as he himself 
concedes, is less persuasive than his former. Farrell seems on the right track, 
but his desire for a single meaning for “tretys” trips him up, as it does the 
other commentators as well.3
Important as it may be to identify the treatise to which Chaucer refers, 
these analyses veer away from the central issues of the passage by focussing 
solely on that one aspect of it. The importance of the passage, its emphasis 
on the relationship between form and content, and between apparent and 
underlying meaning, too often remains unexplored. Not considering the 
“tretys” references in relation to the larger meaning of the passage in which 
they occur in fact impedes our understanding of what the “litel tretys” and 
the “tretys lite” mean. The repeated use of the word “tretys” is part of 
Chaucer’s larger agenda of challenging the easy association between word 
and sentence.
In his repeated juxtaposition in the prologue of the unity of sentence 
with the variation of words used to express it, Chaucer seems to be artic­
ulating an artistic position that by its own overemphasis of a point invites 
us to question, or at least think critically about, the assertion being made. 
Indeed, Chaucer’s “sondry folk” and his “tretys,” as they are used in the 
prologue, serve to help undercut his assertion of the unity of sentence. Ge­
offrey’s speech may be summarized as follows: the words of the gospels vary 
but they all agree in sentence even though their words vary; for though the 
words vary, the sentence is all one. Geoffrey then proceeds to assert that 
though the words he speaks in “this litel tretys heere” will differ in content, 
they will not differ in sentence from “this tretys lite.” In other words, the 
speech contains three assertions of varying form coupled with three asser­
tions of unity of content. Such an elaborate protest is indeed, as Robertson 
asserts, more than seems necessary, unless we are to find the very elaborate­
ness of the claim important itself. As elsewhere in statements concerning 
the artistic process, Chaucer ought not necessarily to be taken at face value.
In Troilus and Criseyde, for example, Chaucer claims to duplicate the 
words and sentence, “As writ myn auctour called Lollius” (1.394), and he
denies responsibility for any offence readers may take on the grounds of this 
duplication:
to every lovere I me excuse,
That of no sentement I this endite,
But out of Latyn in my tongue it write.
Wherfore I nyl have neither thank ne blame 
Of al this werk, but prey yow mekely,
Disblameth me if any word be lame,
For as myn auctor seyde, so sey I. (n. 12-18)
Nowhere does he acknowledge his true source (Boccaccio) or the true lan­
guage of his source (Italian), nor does he acknowledge the extensive changes 
he has in fact made to the version he claims to follow; he claims a unity 
of sentence with, and a slavish faithfulness to the words of, his source, but 
actually provides neither. And we ought not to forget that Chaucer, on 
the grounds of the authority of his source, includes material in Troilus and 
Criseyde about which his narrator expresses doubts, thus at least suggesting 
that claims of authoritative support do not necessarily guarantee authentic­
ity. What Chaucer claims about the sentence of his work, then, and about 
the relationship of his texts to his sources, is not entirely reliable in the case 
of Troilus and Criseyde.
In the prologue to the Legend of Good Women, too, Chaucer plays with 
the idea of sentence and authorial intention. Here, the narrator is defended 
from the charge of offending Love by Alceste, who excuses his translations 
as innocent:
He may translate a thyng in no malyce,
But for he useth bokes for to make,
And taketh non hed of what matere he take,
Therfore he wrot the Rose and ek Criseyde 
Of innocence, and nyste what he seyde. (G 341-45)
Chaucer has Alceste present this conventional defence against the charge he 
has had the god of Love bring against him, but since the numerous alterations 
Chaucer made to the Filostrato are manifest in his Troilus and Criseyde and 
the influence of The Romance of the Rose on his work is equally manifest 
in many ways, the argument that he translates mindlessly, merely reproduc­
ing whatever meaning lies in his source material with no awareness of the 
meaning of the words, is a patently ironic one. The sentence is assuredly 
not “all oon.”
Chaucer again relies on the argument that he cannot be held responsible 
for merely repeating exactly what somebody else said in the prologue to the 
Miller’s tale:
demeth nat that I seye 
Of yvel entente, but for I moot reherce 
Hir tales alle, be they better or werse,
Or elles falsen som of my mateere. (i. 3172-75)
He makes clear here that the tales he recounts represent exactly the words 
of his sources, the pilgrims, and that he is only their compiler, not their 
author; he is thus not responsible for any offensive or sinful content. As 
Alastair Minnis notes, “[t]he common principle involved is that a compiler is 
not responsible for his reader’s understanding of any part of the m ateria , for 
any effect which the materia  may have on him, and, indeed, for any error or 
sin into which the m ateria  may lead a reader” (201-02). Chaucer repeatedly 
claims that he is not to blame, and he warns readers, “Avyseth yow . . ./  
And eek men shal nat maken ernest of game” (i. 3185-86), thus calling on 
readers to exercise their own critical faculties and to interpret aright.
The claims regarding “Sir Thopas” and the “Melibee” echo this abdi­
cation of responsibility for the tales. “Sir Thopas” is “a rym I lerned longe 
agoon” (vn.709), Geoffrey tells us; consequently, he is not to blame for its 
flaws. It is the best rhyme he knows, not one he has made himself. The 
“Melibee,” too, is a tale “told somtyme in sondry wyse /  Of sondry folk” 
(vil.341-42), so again is not original with its teller; indeed, the echo of the 
sundry folk of the pilgrimage subtly reinforces the idea of absolute faithful­
ness to a source, as the General Prologue promised would be accorded to 
the pilgrims. As Leonard Koff observes, “the protestations of ignorance from 
Chaucer’s storyteller, faithful to the words of others . . . only encourage the 
reader to pursue the intent of words he hears from a less than omniscient 
source” (31); Chaucer adopts “the part of a well-meaning storyteller, a pil­
grim among many pilgrims, whose limitations as narrator . . . necessarily 
shift the burden of interpreting stories from himself, because he simply can­
not do so, to the members of his audience” (29-30).
All Chaucer’s claims about his lack of involvement in the tales he tells 
pretend that he provides no art himself but instead simply acts as a conduit 
for sentence, repeating what someone else has said, rather than reworking 
and modifying material to make it his own — as Minnis notes, simply re­
taining the sentence of the original tales “is not enough for Chaucer the 
compiler, who is determined to preserve the proper words of each pilgrim
without ‘feigning’ anything or adding ‘wordes newe’,” as the General Pro­
logue makes clear (202). As mentioned, in the General Prologue, Chaucer 
equates word for word faithfulness to one’s source with truthfulness:
Whoso shal telle a tale after a man,
He moot reherce as ny as evere he kan 
Everich a word, if it be in his charge,
A1 speke he never so rudeliche and large,
Or ellis he moot telle his tale untrewe,
Or feyne thyng, or fynde wordes newe. (1.731-36; emphasis added)
This assertion is followed by a reference to Christ’s speech in “hooly writ,” 
where his words are repeated exactly with no blame accruing the tellers, even 
though Christ “spak hymself ful brode” (1.739). The conceit of exact fidelity 
to a source is repeated throughout Chaucer’s work, but it consistently invites 
us to recognize the falseness of the claim.4
The prologue to the “Melibee” makes a similar claim, insisting on and in­
deed overemphasizing the congruity of meaning between versions of the tale; 
apparently the close correlation between Chaucer’s tale and Renaud’s tends 
to make us disregard this suspicious overemphasis of a claim we elsewhere 
recognize as misleading. Nevertheless, Chaucer’s claim here bears examina­
tion, for in fact he has modified its terms. Whereas elsewhere, even within 
the Canterbury Tales, he insists on word for word faithfulness as essential to 
representation of truth, even using as an authority the example of Christ’s 
words, here he insists on the opposite, using as an authority the example of 
the gospels that record Christ’s words; Chaucer acknowledges divergences 
from his source while simultaneously claiming unity of sentence with it, and 
he does so in a claim that diverges from his own claims elsewhere within the 
Canterbury Tales. Not only, then, does the assertion call itself into question 
because it protests too much, it calls itself into question by articulating a 
position contrary to the one taken elsewhere, the terms of which recall those 
used here. The argument from scripture is conventional, as Minnis notes 
(167), but its context here suggests that Chaucer is undercutting rather 
than asserting the consonance of meaning among tales.
That Chaucer’s claim is misleading seems to me evident from the pro­
logue itself. One need not look to the “Melibee” to see whether it is true 
to the claim that precedes it. As has been noted by such commentators as 
Robertson and Huppe, Chaucer’s assertion that his tale has been told “in 
sondry wyse /  Of sondry folk” may recall the pilgrimage and tales “Of sondry 
folk” (i.25) that comprise the Canterbury Tales-, this assertion, however, im­
mediately precedes Chaucer’s citation of the four gospels as an example of
what he means. The juxtaposition of the tales of the sundry Canterbury folk 
with scripture suggests not a consonance of meaning, as Robertson suggests, 
but rather undercuts the claim being made. If the reference to “sondry folk” 
recalls the pilgrims and their tales, readers are more likely to be surprised 
by this comparison to scripture than they are to be struck by a realization 
of the inner meaning of the tales. As Clark notes, the differences between 
the gospels are “comparatively slight” (153) when compared with the dif­
ferences between the “Melibee” and the other tales — or simply between the 
other tales themselves, for that matter. Even without having yet read the 
“Melibee,” the reader knows that the tales of sundry folk are sundry in­
deed, much more sundry than the gospels, and that they do not accord in 
sentence nearly so obviously as do the gospels, if they do so at all. If the par­
allel between the gospels and other tales is intended, as Robertson asserts, 
to suggest what the sentence of the tales is as well, then the reader is even 
less likely to see the connection. Convincing readers that the Miller’s tale 
has the same sentence as the Monk’s would be difficult enough, without the 
added assertion that both, and all the others, also have the same sentence 
as the gospels. We are more likely to question both the assertion of unity of 
meaning and the appropriateness of the scriptural example than we are to 
accept that the tales we have been reading all have the same sentence.
Furthermore, and to return to the usual focus of discussions of the pro­
logue, Chaucer’s references to the “litel tretys” suggest that the same words 
can mean different things, and not vice versa. As we have seen, commen­
tators in search of the chimera of consistency often want to make the “litel 
tretys” (vil.957) and the “tretys lite” (vil.964), and sometimes the “litel 
tretys” of the retraction (x.1081), all refer to the same work, but doing so 
inevitably makes for a forced reading somewhere. Just as Chaucer can use 
the phrase “pitee renneth soone in gentil herte” (1.1761 and elsewhere) in 
different places to mean different things, just as the meaning of the word 
“look” can shift radically in only two lines, so can the term “tretys” be used 
more than once without necessarily referring to the same treatise each time. 
The “litel tretys” of the retraction might arguably refer to the Canterbury 
Tales rather than simply the Parson’s tale, but to make either “tretys” of 
the prologue to the “Melibee” refer to the Tales requires forcing the meaning 
of the text.
Unforced readings of the prologue references suggest that the first ref­
erence, “this litel tretys heere” (957), with “heere” the key word, refers to 
the “Melibee” itself, which is about to be told to the pilgrims and is indeed 
“heere” to the reader, while the second reference, “this tretys lyte /  After the
which this murye tale I write” (963-64), refers to the tale’s source. Clear un­
derstanding of the passage does not require that the words mean the same 
thing both times; indeed, the most obvious understanding of the passage 
requires that they do not, in contrast both to the claims of the General Pro­
logue that repeating the same words ensures repeating the same meaning, 
and to the claim the passage in which the terms occur makes, that different 
words can nevertheless mean the same thing — “litel tretys” and “tretys lite” 
are not in fact identical terms, though their occurrence in proximity to each 
other in a context stressing that slightly different expressions may mean the 
same thing invites us to miss the distinction. They vary in their words, and 
they vary in their meaning, in contrast to the reiterated claim being made 
in the passage in which they appear.
The repetition of words, terms, phrases, and so on might suggest links in 
meaning, but if we argue that the same words must always mean the same 
things, then the “sondry folk” referred to here must be the pilgrims, and 
logically they too must have all told the “Tale of Melibee,” as the context 
of the reference here clearly suggests. To look at something and see how it 
looks must reveal the truth about it. One treatise is not necessarily identical 
to another, just as one group of sundry people is not identical to another; 
and if the same words do not always refer to the same thing, then how can 
we accept that different words nevertheless “alle acorden as in hire sentence” 
(vn.947), as Chaucer here claims? Chaucer’s “litel tretys” and his “tretys 
lite” have different referents; the similarity of the two expressions serves 
to undercut the assertion of the prologue that the “Melibee” has the same 
sentence as its source.
The prologue, then, far from asserting any unity of meaning, either 
between the “Melibee” and its source or among the tale and the other tales 
recounted, suggests instead that, although connections may exist, no simple 
interpretative grid can be applied. A given word or group of words may carry 
the same meaning at different times, or they may not; similarly, the same 
meaning may be expressed by different words; the same words may even 
carry more than one meaning at once, as the tale’s immediate suggestion of 
an allegorical framework suggests. By reiterating constantly the idea that 
readers will find the sentence of the tale unchanged, without articulating 
what that sentence is, and by undercutting through that reiteration any 
certainty that the interpretative relationship between words and meaning is 
a simple one, Chaucer ensures that readers will come to the tale with the 
subject of that interpretative relationship foremost in their minds.
After going on at such length about the unity of sentence between his tale 
and its source, Chaucer proceeds to bifurcate his own tale, thus undercutting 
even further any faith readers still might have in these claims. Restressing yet 
again that the reader will find no difference between the tale and the “tretys 
lyte /  after the which this murye tale I write” (vn.963-64), Chaucer proceeds 
to exhort his audience to pay attention: “And therfore herkneth what that 
I shal seye, /  And lat me tellen al my tale, I preye” (vil.965-66). For one 
moment, Chaucer steps out of the Canterbury context to acknowledge the 
written nature of his tale, only to return immediately to that context to call 
for readers’ attention in terms of the fiction of an oral presentation; they are 
to listen to what is said, not read what is written, and not to interrupt, as 
Harry did the last tale. By juxtaposing the written and the oral, Chaucer 
creates the illusion of a doubleness for his own single tale, as a written and a 
spoken piece. He also forces readers (or listeners) to recognize the nature of 
the fiction just as they are about to begin the tale; in drawing attention to the 
written tale, Chaucer reminds listeners that the orality of his presentation is 
a fictional representation, and in drawing readers’ attention to the fiction of 
the pilgrimage he requires them to recognize that they are reading a fiction, 
despite the claims of the preceding lines. The audience is called on, then, to 
enter the tale aware of the deception of its context and consequently aware 
of its own deception. To proceed on this basis without questioning the tale’s 
claims would be unwise; Chaucer ensures that readers enter the tale alerted 
to the necessity of their own involvement in determining what words mean in 
their particuar context. No comfortable, pre-existing sentence can be relied 
upon to explain the meaning of Chaucer’s tale.
Algoma University
NOTES
1 I wish to acknowledge the insightful commentaries on early drafts of this paper 
provided by Richard Firth Green and James Miller. I wish also to acknowledge research 
assistance provided by James Allard.
2 Alan T. Gaylord offers a penetrating exploration of Harry’s literary limitations in 
“Sentence and Solaas in Fragment vn of the Canterbury Tales: Harry Bailly as Horseback 
Editor,” and several interpretations of the “Melibee” see it as part of Chaucer’s joke at 
the expense of Harry’s critical taste; see, for instance, Pauli F. Baum, Chaucer, A Critical 
Appreciation, R.M. Lumiansky, O f Sondry Folk, or Trevor Whittock, A Reading o f the 
Canterbury Tales. Harry’s interpretive skills continue to be challenged by commentators 
such as Judith Ferster, who devotes considerable space in Chaucer on Interpretation to 
pointing out Harry’s limitations, Lee Patterson, or Seth Lerer, who encapsulates the 
common view of Harry in the observation, “he misreads nearly everything that comes his 
way” (197).
3 Farrell’s is the most recent attempt of which I am aware to find a referent for 
“tretys.” That such a recent study as Seth Lerer’s, which deals in some depth with the 
problems of reference in the link, asserts of the Melibee, “This is a ‘tretys’ (957, 963), 
a  document, contract, prose text” (193), makes clear that a single referent for “tretys” 
remains a given in discussions of Fragment v i i .
4 There has, of course, been considerable critical discussion of the implications of 
Chaucer’s statements about the authority underlying his texts. There is not room here 
to rehearse such analyses in detail. A good summary of the discussion of the “General 
Prologue” passage can be found in the notes to lines 725-42 in Malcolm Andrew’s The 
General Prologue Part One B: Explanatory Notes, volume two of the Variorum edition 
of Chaucer’s works.
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